How are we intelligible to one another (when we are)?

Here is Espen Dahl from his marvelous “Seeing wonders and the wonder of seeing: Religion at the borders of the ordinary”:

criteria [that secure knowledge and intelligibility, when they do] are not something we have come to agree upon, as we do in contracts or explicit definitions, but are rather the crossroads in the daily traffic of our mutual lives, resting on nothing more and nothing less than our astonishing attunement to the way we see and express the world.

This is what I called ‘communicative mutuality’ in a previous post: that than which there is nothing deeper.  It’s embedded in living naturally, in what Wittgenstein calls ‘natural history,’ where a second nature (more complex than unacculturated, unaccomodated biological nature) comes into its own.


3 comments on “How are we intelligible to one another (when we are)?

    • efmooney says:

      Yes — the devil is in the details. What is an “unacculturated, unaccomodated biological nature”? And perhaps — certainly — even IT [first nature] shows rudimentary forms of communicative mutuality, marvelously complex, like a flock of geese underway at some altitude ‘deciding’ whose turn it is to take the lead, and who can drop back, and for how long — all effortless and accurate.

      • dmfant says:

        sure lots of good stuff in theories of emergence and such I like the enactivists for instance, and then more traditional modes like:
        There is a good chance that Wittgenstein had a kind of conservative nostalgia for the volk-psychology of agrarian peasants not unlike Heidegger and Tolstoy, kind of the philosopher’s version of going native/primitive, but I prefer to focus on his interests in engineering and such, like when Arsic reads Emerson pointing to our daily encounters with cleaning products as ventures in chemistry/alchemy.

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